A Case for Better Missile Defense

Why a Murky Debate Leaves the Way Forward Anything but Clear

By: Eliot Adams

Posted: 12/15/09

On September 17th President Obama announced the cancelation of the European component of the Bush-era missile defense program and declared the implementation of a new system comprising of a mixture of sea and land based systems.

According to secretary of Defense Robert Gates, this new system can be deployed sooner, is less expensive, more adaptable, and focuses on countering Iran's current threat: the US, he says, is not abandoning its allies. Obama insists he remains determined to implement a missile defense system. I interviewed Brian Kennedy, President of the Claremont Institute, a prominent conservative think tank, who shared with me the central conservative criticisms of the plan's cancellation. Kennedy is also a member of the Independent Working Group (IWG) on missile defense. Kennedy seemed skeptical of Obama and Gates' intentions, and fears that Obama will never deploy an effective missile defense system.

The cancelled missile defense plan was developed in 2006 and consisted of ten interceptor missiles stationed in Poland with complimentary sensors in the Czech Republic and other sensors in an undetermined central European nation. Initially, the system was estimated to be in place by 2015, but prolonged negotiation and political maneuvering with the Czech Republic and Poland delayed the plan by two years. The original system was designed to defend Europe from approximately five long range missiles from the Middle East, but on Obama's directive was cancelled to make way for a new defense strategy. A related 2006 plan to defend against North Korean missiles, however, is still underway; these interceptors will be placed in Alaska and California, as the original 2006 plan under George Bush dictated.

The new European plan, proposed on September 17th, consists of two parts. The first involves deploying SM-3 (intermediate to short range missiles) equipped naval ships to oceans surrounding Europe and is estimated to be complete by 2011. The second involves placing clusters of SM-3 missiles in central and southern Europe and should be complete by 2015. The use of sea-based systems allows the missile shield to be more adaptable to future circumstances and more survivable than a fixed system. The SM-3 missiles are not only more proven than the 2006 plan's interceptors, but can also be later adapted to target long range missiles in addition to short and medium range missiles. This shows an attention to Iran's more visible capabilities: because they have not yet developed long range missiles, the SM-3s are better able to intercept potential new aggressive action. The ground-based SM-3s will also be able to target more missiles than those in the 2006 plan. A newer air-, space-, and ground-based sensor system will be used instead of the radar system that was to be built in the Czech Republic. This sensor system is hoped to be able to integrate old, new, and allied radar systems.

But Kennedy, along with many conservatives, feels that Obama's is a betrayal of our Eastern European allies. While Kennedy did not seem to find the Bush era program entirely effective, he argued it should not have been cancelled. "The Czech and Polish sites were never masterstrokes of strategic geometry…but once you say you're going to do it, the cost of doing it is not that much, the political cost of not doing it becomes very high - so now we've alienated the Poles and the Czechs." The Administration counters that a majority of both the Polish and Czech populations actually opposed the 2006 plan because it could strain relations with Russia. As for their governments, Poland and the Czech Republic will likely be the first nations asked to host the newer systems, Gates says. Poland has already stated that it is willing to participate. If not in these nations, other NATO members are to be consulted.

Since the 2006 plan was announced, Russia has opposed it staunchly and used the issue of Iran's nuclear program to distance itself further from the US. Many, including Kennedy, see ending plans for the Polish-Czech missile shield as a concession to Russia. Gates says this is incorrect. Confusion has grown as to Russian motivations, as the threat the missile shield would actually pose to Russia is small. Russia's true objective, some believe, was to give an impression of national individuality and strength in the face of pressure from US strategic policies. This goal would have been accomplished regardless of whether or not the US withdrew the 2006 plan. As long as the 2006 plan was current, Russia resisted through diplomacy and appeared strong.

Kennedy, seemingly unaware of the deadlines Gates set, said that "…by their own standards, I don't think they project being able to deploy or have ready that system [Aegis system] or they're not working on a schedule to get that done in the next five years..." When I told him that Gates' projection was 2011, he replied: "…no one believes that the new system being proposed is going to be robust enough to deal with the Iranian threat."

This is the fact at issue. After I interviewed Kennedy, he gave me an extensive report on missile defense developed by the Independent Working Group. The IWG report describes advantages of sea-based systems, including that "it can be fielded rapidly - within one or two years - largely because the United States has already invested over $80 billion in the Aegis system" and that it "can be readily moved to trouble spots." As explained earlier, the newly assessed "Iranian threat" as Gates describes it is medium range missiles, and he argues that the Aegis systems will be able to meet this threat. The Independent Working Group supports this in saying that "if it continues according to its current schedule, the SM-3 Block I will achieve a limited defense capability against medium-range ballistic missiles."

The IWG report also supports the robustness of the Aegis system: "The current Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) program has achieved an impressive 13 of 15 successful testing record…" These statements would seem to support Gates' claims. But Kennedy's concern may be less about whether the Aegis system is capable than that Gates may have no intention of actually employing capable systems for political reasons. At the same time, though, Kennedy indicated doubt as to the system itself. When asked whether he believed the Aegis systems would actually be deployed by 2011, he replied: "I sincerely hope that they will, and I'd sincerely like them to demonstrate their effectiveness against a wide array of threats."

If, according to the report Kennedy handed me, the new timeline was more immediate and realistic than the 2006 plan's deadline, and if the effectiveness of the new systems more proven than the 2006 plan's systems, Kennedy's skepticism seems to have deeper roots. Kennedy's major criticism of Obama was not that he cancelled the Bush era missile plan - rather, that he felt that "Obama is someone who has never believed in missile defense, ever. [He is] ideologically predisposed to oppose missile defense." Kennedy believes that the new plan will not be a serious defense against Iran.

He compared Obama to Clinton, arguing that both "…knew that if you're simply opposed to missile defense it looks unreasonable…say you're for missile defense to your opponents, political rivals, and then to your friends let them know that you're never really going to do missile defense." Bush, Kennedy argued, was also not invested in missile serious missile defense. He said, "It's [the fact that there is currently no missile defense] not that we don't have the technology, it's almost completely that we don't have the political will." During the Bush administration, Kennedy met with the President in person and tried to persuade him to more aggressively pursue missile defense. To Kennedy's chagrin, even this conservative president "wasn't going to piss off the Russians and the Chinese." Kennedy left discouraged. "Building a robust missile defense," he said, "pisses off the Russians and the Chinese … He [Bush] thinks he needed Russian cooperation on the war on terror and he thinks he needed Chinese … alliances in the economy and elsewhere." A central reason robust missile defense is critical, Kennedy argues, is to avoid ever having to face the prospect of having to order a nuclear first strike. He proposed the scenario in which the United States learned with certainty that Iran had a long-range nuclear missile and was going to launch it at America the next day. Without reliable means of shooting it down, we would be faced with the dilemma of whether to order a nuclear first strike in self-defense. Such a terrible choice seems unthinkable for a democratic nation such as our own.

Yet difficult questions remain. It is interesting how many apparent advantages over the 2006 plan Gates' plan has developed. If the new plan is not meant to actually be effective, why would the current administration cancel Bush's plan? Perhaps Obama wished to simply gain political capital. But if the Gates plan is indeed not intended to come to fruition, out of sensitivity to Russian and Chinese concerns, why would it contain the many apparent technical and strategic improvements that it does? Ultimately, the interview left me with many questions. It appears that the debate boils down to credibility. Since Kennedy's arguments hinge on distrust of the Administration's motives, none of Gates' claims can be persuasive, and since the Administration, in turn has only its promises to trade upon, only time can reveal the truth of the matter.

We all will have to wait some years to see how Gates' plan plays out, so I must leave it up to the reader to analyze the facts available to us. Will Europe actually have a viable missile defense in the coming years? Will America be able to effectively contain a possibly nuclear-armed Iran? As Kennedy was the first to admit, we should all hope that his fears are unfounded. All I ask is that we leave partisanship at the door before considering such a vital issue.